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Seeking to Answer Why the Army of Northern Virginia Lost
On the morning of May 3, 1863, one of the fiercest and most important
battles of the Civil War reached its crescendo around Chancellorsville, Virginia.
Two separate wings of the Army of Northern Virginia reunited after inflicting a
stunning defeat on the Army of the Potomac, and Confederate General Robert E.
Lee rode forward through the haze of battle to the exuberant cheers of his men.
This would be Lee’s greatest triumph, a victory on par with Napoleon’s
achievement at Austerlitz. Outnumbered almost two to one and commanding an
army dangerously divided, Lee demonstrated his audacity, the fighting ability of
his men, and the staggering incompetence of his opponents. Yet, despite this
incredible victory against great odds, in less than two years, Lee and his army
surrendered to Union forces--essentially ending the American Civil War. The
question of how and why that army and its commander fell from the heights of
Chancellorsville to the depths of Appomattox is the subject of Ethan S. Rafuse’s
Robert E. Lee and the Fall of the Confederacy, 1863-1865.
The author asserts that historians have struggled to explain Lee’s ultimate
defeat in spite of his obvious brilliance and the combat prowess of his army. He
argues that Lee was a perceptive strategist who clearly understood that the
Confederacy’s best if not only hope for independence lay in breaking Northern
morale. The general intended to do just that by waging an offensive war
designed to inflict crushing defeats on his opponents. Rafuse also presents the
Army of the Potomac as a solid fighting force with capable if not brilliant
leadership. The Union army eventually used its abundant resources to outlast the
Confederates and limit Lee’s options. In the end, even Lee’s battlefield savvy
could not win the day for the southern republic. Rafuse actually offers little if
anything new or innovative to his audience. In reality, virtually every study of
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Lee, his Union antagonists, the Army of Northern Virginia, the Army of the
Potomac, and the campaigns of the Eastern Theater all touch on the issue of why
Lee failed. Indeed, myriad hypotheses have been asserted. Even Lee himself told
his army upon their surrender that they had been defeated by superior Union
resources. Interestingly, Rafuse painstakingly analyzes each action of the Army
of Northern Virginia from Chancellorsville to Appomattox to end up with the
same conclusion as Lee and a host of latter historians. Again, none of this is new.
In fact, this study of the last two years of Lee's struggle can only serve as a
general account of the Army of Northern Virginia’s slow but steady decline in
the face of superior numbers and resources.
Rafuse’s work does, however, stand out in two areas. First, it is nicely done.
It is well-written, well-organized, and well-argued. He ably weaves together an
analysis of both the political and military context in which Lee and his enemies
operated. Unfortunately, too many military studies fail to take into account the
political and economic limitations of commanders. Second, Rafuse uses common
sense and clear analysis to present and argue his case. Again, too many Civil
War military studies are tied to the biases of the authors, who often launch into
long diatribes. Moreover, there is currently a strong bias against Lee’s brilliance
among many historians. Rafuse’s work puts that to rest. Therefore, in the end,
while Rafuse offers Civil War historians nothing new in terms of argument, he
does present an example of lucid writing and balanced analysis. This is an
excellent book for students, and it serves as an example of how history should be
recorded.
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